


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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI-5433-82
1 July 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Proposed Gulf of Sidra Operation

1. An interagency meeting on the proposed late August Gulf of Sidra operation was held on 29 June chaired by State Political-Military Chief Jonathan Howe. The previously coordinated intelligence community assessment on this issue (attached) had been read by attendees.

2. This IG will result in a policy-options paper (draft attached) to be considered at a SIG during the week of 12 July, which will make recommendations for a mid-July NSC meeting. The issues discussed at this meeting were:

- Should an exercise be held in August, when four carrier groups will be in the Mediterranean? The next feasible date would be January, 1983, unless fleet deployments are rescheduled.
- If decided upon, should it be a full missile exercise, or any of several lesser alternatives such as a steam-by?
- What would be the objectives of undertaking such an operation, and the costs or benefits in regional/domestic Libyan reactions?

3. The various policy elements lined up as follows at this meeting:

- JCS: Commented whether or not to hold the exercise was a political decision, which they would not make. If held, they would prefer a full missile exercise rather than a steam-through or lesser operation -- on the grounds the exercise would be of military benefit and that air defense preparations would automatically be in place in this case.

This Memo is classified
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
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- DOD: The representative from ISA said DOD as a whole preferred the full missile exercise in August, not later. He said they did not feel regional or European repercussions would be unduly negative, nor should they be a factor in our decision. The objective should be to display the continuity and firmness of our approach towards Libya.
- State NEA: Because of the regional tension, they would like to postpone the operation until January. The repercussions of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon would probably still be a major factor, and negative regional reactions important.
- State Legal Bureau: Did not feel the War Powers Act required formal consultation with Congress, but felt informal discussions with key Congressional leaders would be desirable prior to any exercise in potentially hostile waters.
- NSC: Felt that the option to go-ahead in August should be retained, which meant proceeding with planning. He acknowledged that regional tensions were a negative factor, but may have subsided by August. The reason for the exercise is to display firmness and consistency of policy.
- State Policy Planning: Felt an exercise should occur to display resolve, but was not wedded to August.

4. A number of questions were brought up for intelligence consideration at the meeting, as follows:

- Would a lesser-scale exercise have the same regional and domestic impact as the full missile? I commented the reactions would be similar as long as an incident occurred, and that the intelligence community judges an incident will occur if the United States force is detected by the Libyans.
- Would the regional reactions be different if the exercise were not held in August, immediately following on the Lebanese problem. I responded they would probably be less intense, and not take on such an aura of "conspiracy with the Israelis."
- What would the reactions, if any, be if we did not hold the exercise in August -- i.e. after the lapse of one year. I promised a studied response to this query, which is in process.


Charles E. Waterman

Attachments:
Interagency Intelligence Assessment
Draft policy-options paper

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Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

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Attachments:

- A. Interagency Intelligence Assessment
- B. Draft Policy-Options Paper

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